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Introduction
Business environment is an important 
determinant of national competitiveness and 
sustainable long-term economic growth. 
Business environment quality determines the 
risk as well as returns from investment and 
therefore affects investment decisions.
The business environment is largely, if not 
totally, beyond the control of the fi rms and their 
management. It results from existing political, 
legal and regulatory framework; macroeconomic 
policies; institutional infrastructure; social and 
cultural context within which transactions 
take place, the quality of physical and social 
infrastructure and many other factors. Empirical 
research has shown that corruption represents 
a serious obstacle to entrepreneurship and 
business (Kaufmann & Wei, 2000; Meon & 
Sekkat, 2005). Hellman et al. (2000) consider 
corruption, in addition to governance quality and 
state capture, a factor that signifi cantly shapes 
business environment in transition countries.
Government has a vital role in creating and 
ensuring the stable and healthy socio-economic 
environment for businesses. By ensuring lower 
transaction costs on individuals and fi rms, well-
regulated business environment allows them to 
operate more effi ciently. According to Guriev 
(2004) corruption and poor institutions are key 
determinants of existing poor regulation and 
misgovernance. Breen and Gillanders (2012) 
consider a country’s existing stock of regulation 
as a product of its recent history of institutional 
quality and corruption. Main fi ndings of their 
research show that the level of corruption is 
the most important factor that determines the 
quality of the business environment, trumping 
the quality of institutions and a range of other 
indicators. Therefore, development and 
implementation of appropriate strategies, 
focused on continuous improvement of 
business environment are of great importance.
Although some authors justify corruption on 
the ground that it helps fi rms to deal with obstacles 
caused by ineffi cient public administration 
(Dreher & Gassebner, 2013; Leff, 1964), corrupt 
business environment forces fi rms to allocate 
signifi cant part of their human, fi nancial and 
other resources to corrupt practices instead of 
focusing on innovation and development. Large 
companies are in better position because they 
have resources and capacities to protect their 
business interests and cope with corruption, 
while small and medium-sized enterprises are 
more strongly affected by corruption. There 
is also evidence that the extent of corruption 
varies in different regions of the same country 
(Linhartová & Volejníková, 2015). This study 
tends to contribute to the literature on the 
causes of corruption. Particularly, we empirically 
test the relevance of various determinants of 
corruption in the business environment, on the 
example of a single transition economy. Serbia 
is a country where corruption is perceived as 
a major impediment to investing and doing 
business effi ciently (Stošić, Nikolić, & Đukić, 
2011). In our analysis, we use data on the 
perceptions of corruption throughout Serbian 
business environment, as well as the real cases 
of corruption, in the form of informal payments 
or gifts for various purposes. We investigate to 
what extent corruption represents an obstacle 
to business transactions and offer potential 
explanations of the determinants of such 
attitudes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
presents a brief overview of the main fi ndings 
of the literature on corruption, its determinants 
and the impact on the business environment. 
Section 2 describes the data sources and explains 
the proposed methodological procedures. In 
sections 3 and 4, the results of empirical tests are 
presented and discussed. The paper ends with 
a summary of the main fi ndings.
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1. Literature Review
Corruption is a complex social phenomenon that 
has a long history. Forms, causes, mechanisms 
and conseqences of corruption represent 
a popular subject of scientifi c inquiries (Mauro, 
1995; Paldam, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Yet, despite numerous 
political, legal, economic and sociological 
studies, there is no globally accepted defi nition 
of corruption. Corruption is most commonly 
defi ned as the misuse or the abuse of power 
for personal gain and exists in both public and 
private sectors.
Corruption is predominantly associated with 
the public sector. Mauro (1995) deals only with 
government corruption. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) focus their attention on corruption in 
the public sector, where corruption is a “sale 
by government offi cial of government property 
for personal gain” (p. 599). Perhaps the most 
comprehensive defi nition of corruption is given 
by Tanzi (1995), who associates corruption 
with the deliberate violation of impartiality in 
decision making process, for the purpose of 
appropriating benefi ts for oneself or for related 
individuals.
Regardless of its forms, it is widely believed 
that corruption represents a considerable 
impediment to sustainable growth and 
development (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi, 1998). 
High levels of corruption affect investment 
decisions and economic growth (Mauro, 1997). 
Governance and corruption issues, according 
to Kauffman (2005), represent key constraints 
to investment and business. Business 
environment that is conducive to growth has 
many dimensions, related to the quality of 
institutions, government policy, regulatory 
framework etc. (UNODC, 2013). Besides 
political and economic stability, a sound 
business environment to a great deal depends 
on the control of corruption. Perceptions about 
business environment are a fundamental 
factor that shapes decisions of fi rms. If fi rms 
perceive business environment as favourable, 
they will be more inclined to invest. Corruption 
represents a kind of tax on economic activity, 
which raises transaction costs (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993). Through rising uncertainty and 
reduced profi tability of enterprises, corruption 
reduces the willingness of enterprises to 
invest. It will in turn reduce the attractiveness 
of entrepreneurship; entrepreneurial talent will 
be diverted to less productive activities, with 
the negative impact on the innovation and 
thus economic growth (Harris & Merwe, 2012, 
p. 171). There is also output loss due to the 
misallocation of resources (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1993), distortions of incentives, strengthening 
of the informal economy, changing structure 
of investment and government spending. 
Corruption negatively affects country’s capacity 
to attract foreign direct investment, which 
is a major vehicle of technology transfer 
(Abed & Davodi, 2002; Smarzynska & Wei, 
2000). Indices of corruption send out signals 
to potential investors, providing information 
necessary for the assessment of a country 
risk and the cost of doing business, and for 
the decision where to invest. However, some 
authors consider corruption as benefi cial 
because it helps to overcome the ineffi ciency 
of the government regulations and avoid 
bureaucratic obstacles (Leff, 1964). According 
to Ali and Isse (2003), bribery is a substitute for 
higher wages, meaning that it saves money for 
the government.
In the political sphere, corruption causes 
the decrease of voters’ confi dence in elected 
representatives, undermines the rule of law, 
and undermines the reputation of government 
and other institutions. Corruption affects the 
credibility of political institutions in front of 
citizens and the rest of the world. According to 
Hodgson and Jiang (2007, p. 1057) corruption 
reduces levels of trust in dealing with both 
business and the state. It erodes confi dence in 
public institutions, diminishes state’s ability to 
provide public goods and services and create 
conducive environment for private sector 
development.
Furthermore, corruption affects other 
important determinants of business 
environment, such as social capital (Putnam, 
1993; Fritzen, Serritzlew, & Svendsen, 2014). 
Reliance on informal contacts and family, 
friendship, ethnic and other ties caused by 
corruption leads to the loss of benefi ts of 
wider cooperation and competition (Graeff & 
Svendsen, 2013). It undermines the effi cacy 
of the formal rules that are very important for 
the effi cient market economy. Strong informal 
networks with bonding social ties and lack of 
effi cient formal institutions create fertile ground 
for further expansion of corruption (Lipset & 
Lenz, 2000; Harris, 2007). In the long run, 
corruption causes the increase of inequality and 
poverty, creating a general climate of insecurity, 
EM_4_2018.indd   49 28.11.2018   13:12:48
50 2018, XXI, 4
Ekonomie
lack of trust in institutions and the general 
dissatisfaction of all social stratums (Rothstein 
& Uslaner, 2005).
In transition countries, the collapse of 
the existing institutions of centrally-planned 
economy and slow emergence of new 
institutions compatible with market economy 
has established institutional vacuum and fertile 
ground for public sector corruption. Institutional 
weakness, such as poorly defi ned property 
rights, weak accountability of public offi cials and 
limited political competition, has had a profound 
impact on the susceptibility of transition 
countries to corruption. At the beginning of 
transition these countries were focused on 
the problem of economic transformation and 
privatization. Reforms of the state, public 
administration and of the judiciary were largely 
neglected (Ackerman, 1992, p. 46). These 
developments affected the pace of political 
and economic reforms and created a unique 
transition path for every country. Countries 
where transition path led to concentration of 
economic power in a setting of weak institutions 
became especially vulnerable to corruption.
The region of the Western Balkans is 
perceived as a region of high corruption. 
Corruption is perceived as a major obstacle for 
investment and doing business in this region 
(EUROCHAMBRES, 2009). This is confi rmed 
by the results of several studies (Stošić, Nikolić, 
& Đukić, 2011; Džafi ć et al., 2011; Budak & Rajh, 
2011). According to business representatives in 
Serbia, corruption is the fi fth most signifi cant 
obstacle to doing business, right after tax rates, 
ineffi cient government bureaucracy, political 
instability and access to fi nancing (WEF, 2016). 
United Nations Offi ce on Drugs and Crime 
study about the impact of corruption on private 
enterprises in Serbia reveals that corruption 
is a great hindrance to private enterprise and 
has a negative effect upon private investment 
(UNDOC, 2013).
The obvious negative impact of corruption 
on economic and social outcomes implicates 
that exploring possible determinants of 
corruption is very important. However, a serious 
limitation of studies that explore causes 
of corruption relates to the problems in its 
measurement. Actual corruption incidents are 
very hard to detect, since agents tend to hide 
their participation in corrupt practices. For this 
reason, direct measures of corruption are rarely 
available for research. Therefore, widely used 
measures of corruption are estimates based 
on perceptions of the frequency and level of 
corruption, captured by surveys. Although 
perceptions could possibly deviate from 
actual corruption incidents (Treisman, 2007), 
perceptions based indicators are considered 
a reliable indicator of corruption. In that sense, 
when exploring corruption determinants, 
empirical studies mainly rely on data about 
perceived corruption.
There are many possible causes of 
corruption suggested by the literature. 
Economic determinants of corruption most 
often include country’s economic wealth (Hall 
& Jones, 1999), income inequality (Paldam, 
2002), economic freedom (Treisman, 2000), 
trade openness (Persson et al., 2003), infl ation 
and macro-economic performance (Melgar et 
al., 2010). Studies related to political causes 
of corruption have focused on the impact of 
political instability (Lederman et al., 2005), 
political liberties (Treisman, 2000), electoral 
systems (Persson et al., 2003), etc.
Government is cited as the important 
source of corruption because extensive state 
regulation of the economy creates possibilities 
for the extraction of rents. Empirical research 
about origins of corruption indicates that poorly 
functioning institutions and policies undermine 
free trade and competition, thus leading to 
corruption. Based on the analysis of institutional 
quality in 18 OECD countries Dreher et al. (2009) 
fi nd that increase in institutional quality reduces 
the level of corruption. Extensive regulation of 
market entry, in the form of procedures, costs 
and time to start a new business, is consistent 
with higher levels of corruption (Djankov et 
al., 2002). A highly diversifi ed trade tariff may 
encourage public offi cials to extract bribes from 
importers (Gatti, 1999).
There are two basic sources of corruption 
related to government activity. The fi rst 
concerns the way government performs its 
activities, such as tax collection, customs and 
licensing. Powers of the government offi cials 
are often accompanied by discretion, non-
transparent or ambiguous procedures, creating 
favourable conditions for extracting bribes. 
Therefore, the rule of law and the quality of 
bureaucracy are important determinants of 
corruption (Rauch & Evans, 1997; Ali & Isse, 
2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2004). Corruption tends 
to be lower in the environment characterized by 
strong and effective judicial system, contract 
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enforceability and professional bureaucracy. 
The second includes political actors involved 
in political decision making, such as legislation, 
privatization and contracting, whose activities 
may cause a substantial dysfunction of the 
legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
power. Activities of interest groups, which are 
often illegal and non-transparent, may infl uence 
government policies, regulations and laws, with 
the purpose of achieving private benefi ts.
Institutional and generalized trusts are 
also perceived as relevant predictors of 
corruption (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). 
Corrupt environments are characterized by 
considerable deterioration of trust in institutions 
and politicians, as well as in business partners.
2. Data and Methodology
For the purpose of this study, data from the fi fth 
round of Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey – BEEPS V (EBRD, 
2015) were used. The BEEPS survey has been 
conducted as a joint initiative of the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the World Bank, since 1999, as a fi rm-level 
survey based on interviews with fi rm managers, 
with the aim of assessing the quality of the 
business environment and main challenges of 
the private sector development. The fi fth round 
of the survey, implemented over the period 
2012-2014, covered 15,883 enterprises in 30 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
The research in this paper is based on data from 
the survey implemented in Serbia. Regarding 
sampling implementation, in each country two 
sampling frames have been used: the fi rst, an 
offi cial frame of establishments supplied by 
the offi cial sources in the country (Business 
Registers Agency in the case of Serbia); 
and the second, consisting of enterprises 
interviewed in previous round of the survey. In 
particular, out of the total number of contacted 
establishments in Serbia (836), the number of 
non-eligible units was 73, 40 establishments 
were impossible to contact, while 363 refused 
to participate in the survey. The number of 
completed interviews was 360, indicating the 
response rate of 0.43. The interviews with 
senior managers were conducted from January 
to August 2013. The data used in this paper 
express their attitudes about relations between 
business and government. The ownership 
structure of the surveyed enterprises is as 
follows: 317 enterprises are 100% owned by 
domestic private capital, 25 enterprises are of 
100% private foreign ownership, 10 enterprises 
have a certain percentage of state capital 
(from 1 to 93%), while the rest (8 enterprises) 
report combined ownership. All types of 
enterprises (micro, small, medium and large) 
are encompassed by the survey.
In the attempt to explore the underlying 
causes of corruption perceptions, we test 
whether the perceptions of corruption as an 
obstacle to business transactions differ based 
on distinctive features of the fi rms. Besides 
cross-tabulations and descriptive statistics, 
a nonparametric test for the analysis of variance 
was performed, as to determine whether there 
are statistically signifi cant differences in the 
perceived spread of corruption across a number 
of independent variables (regions, size of locality, 
industry, size, and years of operation). Since the 
examined variables consist of more categories, 
with a clear ordering and equally spaced 
intervals between the values, the method of 
choice is the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis-
of-variance test, H (Kruskal & Wallis, 1952; 
1953). This is a non-parametric version of the 
one-way ANOVA and an extension of the Mann-
Whitney U test, used when the assumption of 
normality is violated, as in the case of data used 
for this study. The data in our sample meet all 
the assumptions that underpin the application 
of Kruskal-Wallis H test. All the dependent 
variables are measured on a Likert scale with 
5 or more points; independent variables consist 
of two or more categorical independent groups; 
observations are independent; and, most 
importantly, distributions of scores (for each 
group of independent variable) have the same 
shape (variability).
Additionally, by specifying an ordered 
logistic regression model, we explore the 
determinants of the attitudes on corruption. We 
estimate the relations between the perceptions 
of corruption and several independent 
variables (frequencies of unoffi cial payments 
and gifts for different purposes, perceived 
impact of informal payments on government 
decisions, perceptions of the importance 
of political stability and courts for business 
operations). As the dependent variable in the 
model is categorical and ordered (perceptions 
of corruption as an obstacle for doing 
business, expressed by 5-point Likert scale), 
we estimate an ordered logistic regression 
model, also known as proportional odds model 
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(Aitchison & Silvey, 1957; McKelvey & Zavoina, 
1975; Long & Freese, 2014).
Using the ologit model, we obtain the 
probabilities of observing each of the possible 
outcomes i of dependant variable (degrees 
of perceived corruption) within the range of 
the estimated cut-points. In other words, the 
probability of outcome i is calculated as the 
probability that the value of the linear function 
of the independent variables (including the 
error term uj) is within the range of estimated 
cut-points (ki):
 
(1)
In this model, the relationship between 
each pair of outcome groups is the same and it 
is described by one set of coeffi cients, so only 
one equation is estimated. Two procedures 
are performed for testing the proportional odds 
assumption: a likelihood ratio test (Wolfe & 
Gould, 1998) and Brant test (Brant, 1990).
Based on the model, we obtain predictions 
regarding the effects that improving business 
environment can have on corruption perceptions 
of the existing and potential business actors.
3. Results
3.1 Data Overview and Descriptive 
Statistics
Throughout transition countries, fi rm managers 
report that top three obstacles, as perceived 
by each fi rm, are competitors’ practices in the 
informal sector, access to fi nance and electricity 
issues (EBRD, 2015a). However, corruption 
still remains one of the biggest obstacles, even 
though the survey results indicate there has 
been a signifi cant decline in the share of fi rms 
reporting that informal payment or gifts were 
expected or requested from them in different 
interactions with government offi cials. One 
of the reasons for this decline, as reported, 
might be the introduction of electronic fi ling 
and payment systems, which reduce the 
possibilities for offi cials to request informal 
payments. Still, there are a number of fi rms that 
report signifi cant share of their annual sales for 
the purpose of “getting things done”.
The top three business environment 
obstacles identifi ed by fi rms in Serbia are political 
instability, tax rates and access to fi nance 
(EBRD, 2015). These results are determined 
by the intensive political developments in 
the period prior to survey – presidential and 
parliamentary elections, followed by the change 
of the ruling party. The new government has 
introduced a fi scal consolidation reform, which 
caused a rise in the tax rates. Access to fi nance 
has become the biggest problem for Serbian 
fi rms, due to the lack of credit funds and 
increased interest rates. Besides, corruption 
appears to be an important obstacle in Serbia. 
As for 6.11% of the total number of surveyed 
fi rms corruption represents the biggest obstacle 
for business operations.
The scope for corruption appears every 
time a fi rm interacts with government offi cials 
or service providers. However, the perceptions 
of fi rms about corruption activities tend to 
differ, depending on their size, industry, region 
or ownership structure. Small fi rms in Serbia 
complain the most about corruption, while all 
the complaints arise from the fi rms that are 
100% owned by domestic private capital. The 
majority of fi rms that complain about corruption 
are operating in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia.
A detailed statistics on fi rms’ perceptions 
of corruption as an obstacle of their current 
business operations is presented in Tab. 1 (the 
responses are assigned scores from 0 = No 
obstacle to 4 = Very severe obstacle). The data 
indicate that corruption is widespread in the 
business environment. Less than a half of the 
surveyed fi rms do not experience any problems 
with corruption, while 6.11% perceive corruption 
as a very severe obstacle to their business. 
Furthermore, over 40% of the respondents 
claim that total annual cost of their operations 
would decrease if corruption was no longer an 
obstacle (not enclosed in the table). The mean 
value of expected cost decrease reported by 
the fi rms is 11.75%.
In order to explore whether such attitudes 
on corruption stem from real cases of corrupt 
activities or merely perceptions on the spread of 
corruption in their environment, the respondents 
have been asked to report if any gifts or informal 
payments had been expected or requested 
from them when meeting tax offi cials, obtaining 
an import license or obtaining an operating 
license. The survey data indicate that 5-6% of 
any interactions with the government authorities 
are followed by requesting or expected gifts of 
informal payments from the fi rms. Additionally, 
3 out of 29 fi rms that have attempted to secure 
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a government contract declared that a certain 
percentage (2-8%) of the contract value “would 
typically be paid in informal payments or gifts 
to secure the contract”. Firms report that they 
pay certain percentages of total annual sales as 
informal payments or gifts to public offi cials to 
“get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, 
licenses, regulations, services etc. About 8% of 
the surveyed fi rms report that in their business 
environment, an establishment such as theirs 
pays a certain percentage of total annual sales 
in informal payments or gifts to public offi cials.
The perceptions of the respondents on how 
common it is for fi rms in their line of business to 
have to pay some irregular “additional payments 
or gifts” to get things done with regard to customs, 
taxes, licenses, regulations, services etc. are 
presented in Tab. 2 (the responses are assigned 
scores from 1 = Never to 6 = Always). Only 
a quarter of respondents believe that it is never 
common for fi rms to pay additional payments 
or gifts for such purposes, while for 12% of the 
surveyed fi rms, it is quite common to make such 
payments. Beside perceptions on how common 
it is for fi rms to pay additional payments and gifts, 
the respondents have reported on the frequency 
of payments for different purposes (to deal with 
customs, courts and taxes).
It is assumed that the main reason for 
fi rms’ making unoffi cial payments or gifts is 
for them to gain advantages in the drafting of 
laws, decrees, regulations, and other binding 
government decisions. The following table 
presents the extent to what private payments/
gifts or other benefi ts to parliamentarians 
and government, regional or local offi cials to 
affect their votes or the content of government 
decrees, had a direct impact on business of the 
surveyed fi rms (Tab. 3).
No obstacle 42.50%
Minor obstacle 21.39%
Moderate obstacle 15.28%
Major obstacle 11.11%
Very severe obstacle 6.11%
Don’t know / No answer 3.61%
Total 100%
Source: BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Tab. 1: To what degree is corruption an obstacle in business environment
It is common to pay 
additional payments 
“to get things done”
To deal with 
customs/imports
To deal with 
courts
To deal with taxes 
and tax collection
Never 25.28% 41.39% 42.50% 39.72%
Seldom 21.94% 15.83% 14.17% 17.22%
Sometimes 24.17% 14.17% 14.17% 14.72%
Frequently 8.33% 4.17% 5.56% 3.61%
Very frequently 2.50% 1.11% 0.83% 1.11%
Always 0.83% 0.56% 0.56% 0.00%
Don’t know 16.94% 22.78% 22.22% 23.61%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Tab. 2: The frequency of informal payments
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Descriptive statistics of the variables used 
in the analysis that follows is presented in 
Tab. 4. Observations with missing values (Don’t 
know, Does not apply) have been omitted prior 
to the calculations.
3.2 Kruskal-Wallis Equality-of-
Populations Rank Test
The next step of the analysis is to test whether 
the perceptions of corruption as an obstacle in 
the business environment in Serbia differ based 
No impact Minor Moderate Major Decisive N/A
To affect parliamentary 
votes 59.17% 7.50% 3.61% 1.39% 0.83% 27.50%
To affect government 
decrees 59.72% 6.39% 3.61% 1.67% 0.83% 27.78%
To affect local and 
regional offi cials 55.83% 9.17% 4.72% 1.67% 1.11% 27.50%
Source: BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max
Corruption as obstacle to business 202 1.148515 1.307355 0 4
Frequency of payments – customs 202 1.792079 1.068004 1 6
Frequency of payments – courts 202 1.861386 1.115514 1 6
Frequency of payments – taxes 202 1.831683 1.022817 1 5
Impact of payments – parliamentarians 202 1.301980 0.714384 1 5
Impact of payments – government 202 1.297030 0.740372 1 5
Impact of payments – local/reg. offi cials 202 1.396040 0.829544 1 5
Courts as obstacle to business 202 0.861386 1.226001 0 4
Political instability as obstacle 202 1.752475 1.333875 0 4
Source: BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Dependent variable Independent variable df χ2 (with ties) p-value
Corruption as obstacle
Industry 2 6.882 0.0320
Region 3 9.973 0.0188
Unoffi cial payments – Customs Size of locality 3 8.838 0.0315
Unoffi cial payments – Courts Region 3 9.729 0.0210
Impact of payments – parliamentarians Industry 2 8.105 0.0174
Impact of payments – government decrees Industry 2 13.052 0.0015
Source: author’s calculations based on BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Tab. 3: The impact of unoffi cial payments
Tab. 4: Descriptive statistics
Tab. 5: Kruskal-Wallis test
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on distinctive features of the fi rms (fi rm size, 
region, industry or the size of locality where fi rms 
operate, number of years of operation). The 
data in our sample meet the assumptions that 
underpin the use of Kruskal-Wallis H test. The 
results of the Kruskal-Wallis H are presented in 
Tab. 5 (only results at p < 0.05 signifi cance level 
are displayed).
The Kruskal-Wallis H test showed 
that there was a statistically signifi cant 
difference in perceiving corruption as an 
obstacle to business operations between the 
manufacturing, retail and other services, as 
well as between the four regions of Serbia. 
Also, frequency of unoffi cial payments/gifts that 
fi rms would make in a given year to deal with 
customs differ signifi cantly between localities 
of different sizes, while frequency of unoffi cial 
gifts paid to deal with courts are signifi cantly 
different between Serbian regions. The 
results also indicate that there is a statistically 
signifi cant difference between fi rms from 
different industries regarding the extent to 
which private payments to parliamentarians 
(paid to affect their votes) have a direct impact 
on their business. Belonging to manufacturing, 
retail or other services industry is also a valid 
predictor of the extent that private payments to 
government offi cials (paid to affect the content 
of government decrees) have a direct impact on 
fi rms’ business.
The results of the performed test prove that, 
depending on the industry they belong to, region 
they operate in, or size of their city/town, fi rms 
have different perceptions of how corruption, in 
the form of unoffi cial payments or gifts to public 
offi cials, affects their business operations. The 
following analysis is aimed at exploring the 
causes that determine such perceptions.
3.3 Estimation of the Perceived 
Corruption Determinants
The survey data on corruption in Serbian 
business environment indicate a signifi cant 
prevalence of corruption, as perceived by 
economic actors. In the attempt to explore the 
underlying causes of corruption perceptions, 
we test whether the attitudes on corruption 
are determined by real cases of corruption 
or perceptions of the impact that informal 
payments may have on the business 
operations. Specifying the ordered logistic 
regression model, we test the explanatory 
power of several potential determinants of 
attitudes on corruption. The response variable 
in the model is defi ned as the degree to which 
corruption presents an obstacle to business 
operations of respondents, measured by 
5 point Likert scale. The explanatory variables 
used in the model include: the frequencies 
of unoffi cial payments or gifts for different 
purposes (dealing with customs, courts or 
Ordered logistic regression Number of obs = 202
LR chi2(5) = 50.63
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0893Log likelihood = -258.2548
Corruption as obstacle Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unoffi cial payments-customs .3581645 .1489654 2.40 0.016 .0661977 .6501313
Unoffi cial payments-taxes .4267126 .1554440 2.75 0.006 .1220479 .7313772
Impact-local/regional offi cials .3267984 .1629264 2.01 0.045 .0074685 .6461284
Courts as obstacle .2146813 .1148418 1.87 0.062 -.0104044 .439767
Political instability as obstacle .1670583 .1030101 1.62 0.105 -.0348378 .3689545
/cut1 2.113232 .3855439 (Ancillary parameters)
/cut2 3.030764 .4147334
/cut3 4.192927 .4714150
/cut4 5.335898 .5401861
Source: author’s calculations based on BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Tab. 6: Regression results for determinants of perceived corruption
EM_4_2018.indd   55 28.11.2018   13:12:49
56 2018, XXI, 4
Ekonomie
taxes), the impact that unoffi cial payments to 
public offi cials (parliamentarians, government 
offi cials, local and regional offi cials) have on 
the business operations of the respondents, as 
well as attitudes of the respondents related to 
the quality of the judicial system and political 
stability.
The empirical estimates of the ologit model 
are presented in Tab. 6.
The model summary indicates the specifi cs 
of the fi tted model. The LR Chi-Square of 
50.63 with a p-value of 0.0000 implies that the 
model as a whole is statistically signifi cant, 
as compared to the null model with no 
predictors. It confi rms that least one of the 
predictors’ regression coeffi cient is not equal 
to zero. Degrees of freedom of the Chi-Square 
distribution used to test the LR Chi-Square 
statistic are defi ned by the number of predictors 
in the model. The value of pseudo-R-squared is 
subject to a variety of interpretations; however 
it does not indicate the proportion of variance 
for the response variable explained by the 
predictors, as the R-square found in OLS 
regression. Ancillary parameters (cut points) 
shown in the regression output are used to 
differentiate adjacent levels of the dependant 
variable, indicating the cuts in the continuous 
latent variable. Since our response variable has 
5 levels, the number of cut points (thresholds) 
is 4. For example, cut1 differentiates the lowest 
level of the response variable (corruption is no 
obstacle to business operations) from all the 
higher levels of this variable, given that values 
of all predictors is zero. In our case, all values 
of latent variable under 2.11 would imply that 
corruption is no obstacle to business, given that 
fi rms never make informal payments or gifts to 
deal with customs or taxes; that these kinds of 
payments have no impact on fi rms’ operations, 
and that courts and political instability are not 
perceived as obstacles to business.
In our model, business actors that are 
frequently exposed to the undertakings of 
paying unoffi cial payments or gifts in order 
to deal with customs and taxes tend to 
apprehend corruption as a severe obstacle 
to their business operations. According to the 
values of the ordered log-odds regression 
coeffi cients, for a one unit increase in these 
two predictors the perceptions of corruption 
are expected to change in the ordered log-
odds scale by 0.36 and 0.43 respectively, other 
variables held constant. For example, a one 
unit increase in frequency of informal payments 
aimed at “getting things done” in dealing with 
the customs would result in 0.36 unit increase 
in the ordered log-odds for response variable 
to be in a higher category (higher degree to 
what corruption is perceived as an obstacle to 
business operations), while other variables in 
the model are held constant.
Similar to this, respondents whose 
operations have been subject to decisive impact 
of unoffi cial payments, gifts or other benefi ts to 
local or regional government offi cials, tend to 
perceive corruption as harmful to their business. 
The ordered log-odds estimate for a one unit 
increase in this predictor on the expected level 
of the dependent variable is 0.33, given the 
other variables are held constant in the model. 
On the other hand, perceptions of respondents 
related to the judicial effi ciency or political 
stability as determinants of business operations 
do not have statistical signifi cance (alpha level 
set at 0.05) in explaining corruption perceptions.
4. Discussion and Interpretation 
of Research Results
It is clear from our results that fi rms have 
different perceptions of how corruption, in the 
form of unoffi cial payments or gifts to public 
offi cials, affects their business operations, 
depending on the industry they belong to, 
region they operate in, or size of their locality 
(see part 3.3). The empirical analysis indicates 
that there are signifi cant differences in 
perceiving corruption as an obstacle to business 
operations between the manufacturing, retail 
and other services, as well as between the 
regions of the analysed country. Perceptions 
on frequency of unoffi cial payments that fi rms 
make to deal with customs differ signifi cantly 
between fi rms from localities of different sizes, 
while perceptions on frequency of unoffi cial 
payments to deal with courts are signifi cantly 
different between regions. These fi ndings 
are in line with the results of recent empirical 
analysis of the business consequences of 
local bribery environments (Hanoushek & 
Kochanova, 2016), indicating that bureaucratic 
corruption is a local phenomenon, that depends 
not only on country, but also industry, fi rm and 
market size. Furthermore, such fi ndings imply 
the importance of identifying the potential 
determinants of attitudes on corruption.
The results of the ordered logistic regression 
models are most commonly interpreted in 
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terms of proportional odds ratios. As ordered 
logit models estimate a single equation over 
all levels of dependent variable, a test of the 
proportional odds assumption is required to 
confi rm the validity of one equation model. 
This would mean that the relationship between 
each pair of outcome groups is the same and 
described by one set of coeffi cients. Testing 
the proportional odds assumption is performed 
using two procedures: a likelihood ratio test 
(Wolfe & Gould, 1998) and Brant test (Brant, 
1990). Results are displayed in Tabs. 7 and 8.
Both test yield non-signifi cant results, 
indicating that the assumption of parallel-lines 
model is not violated and that the relations 
between each pair of outcome groups in 
our model are the same. After obtaining 
proportional odds ratios, the model yields the 
following results (Tab. 9).
chi2(15) 15.5400
Prob > chi2 0.4133
Source: author’s calculations based on BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Variable Chi2 p>chi2 df
All 18.52 0.236 15
Unoffi cial payments-customs 0.32 0.956 3
Unoffi cial payments-taxes 1.38 0.711 3
Impact-local/regional offi cials 5.41 0.144 3
Courts as obstacle 2.99 0.393 3
Political instability as obstacle 4.99 0.173 3
Source: author’s calculations based on BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Tab. 7: Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds
Tab. 8: Brant test of parallel regression assumption
Ordered logistic regression Number of obs = 202
LR chi2(5) = 50.63
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.0893Log likelihood = -258.2548
Corruption as obstacle Odds ratio Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Unoffi cial payments-customs 1.430701 .2131249 2.40 0.016 1.068438 1.915792
Unoffi cial payments-taxes 1.532212 .2381732 2.75 0.006 1.129808 2.077940
Impact-local/regional offi cials 1.386522 .2259011 2.01 0.045 1.007496 1.908139
Courts as obstacle 1.239467 .1423425 1.87 0.062 0.989650 1.552345
Political instability as obstacle 1.181823 .1217398 1.62 0.105 0.965762 1.446222
/cut1 2.113232 .3855439 (Ancillary parameters)
/cut2 3.030764 .4147334
/cut3 4.192927 .4714150
/cut4 5.335898 .5401861
Source: author’s calculations based on BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Tab. 9: Proportional odds ratios
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We interpret the proportional odds ratios in 
the following manner: for a one unit increase 
in frequency of informal payments to deal with 
customs (other variables in the model held 
constant), the odds for corruption to be perceived 
as very severe obstacle (level 4) versus the 
combined lower degrees of corruption as an 
obstacle are 1.43 times greater. Likewise, since 
the ordered logit model estimates one equation 
over all levels of the dependent variable, these 
odds hold for the combined higher levels of 
dependent variable (levels 4 and 3), versus 
combined lower levels (2, 1 and 0), and so on. 
For a one unit increase in the second predictor 
(frequency of informal payments to deal 
with taxes), the odds of dependent variable 
to take highest value are 1.53 greater than 
the combined lower values. Similarly, a one 
unit increase in perceived impact of informal 
payments to local and regional offi cials on fi rms 
increases the odds for perceiving corruption as 
an obstacle 1.38 times.
In the output above, the following predictors 
are found to be statistically signifi cant in 
estimating the perceptions of corruption: the 
frequencies of unoffi cial payments or gifts 
for dealing with customs (p = 0.016), the 
frequencies of unoffi cial payments or gifts for 
dealing with taxes (p = 0.006) and the impact 
of unoffi cial payments to local or regional 
government offi cials aimed at affecting their 
votes or content of government decrees 
(p = 0.045).
Such fi ndings are rather expected, taking 
into account the local context and the results 
of a number of previous studies of corruption 
and doing business in Serbia. Although there is 
a common view of the prevalence of corruption 
in the areas that require frequent interactions 
with public offi cials (customs clearings or tax 
inspections) throughout the Western Balkans 
region, the prevalence of business bribery in 
Serbia is signifi cantly higher than the average 
for the Western Balkans (UNODC, 2013). 
According to the same study, customs offi cers, 
municipal and provincial offi cers tend to be 
the type of public offi cials that are more often 
involved in bribery. Prior investigations of 
corruption at the customs in Serbia (Begović 
et al., 2002) indicate that corruption is a quite 
common occurrence regarding the customs 
and that business people have little faith in 
the possibility of effective protection from 
the corruption at the customs. Complex tax 
systems combined with excessive discression 
of tax offi cials and frequent contacts between 
tax offi cials and fi rms are identifi ed as the 
main causes of the spread of corruption in this 
public service (Tanzi, 2013). The organized 
commitment of tax fraud by persons in 
government positions and with decision-making 
power has been reported as the most important 
offence category processed by Serbian courts 
in the last two decades (Van Duyne et al., 2012). 
Local government is perceived as an important 
actor in enhancing the quality of business 
environment (Janković-Milić et al., 2014). 
A more recent study on corruption in Serbian 
economy (CLDS, 2014) supports the notion 
that the level of corruption in Serbian business 
environment is still rather substantial. Frequent 
encountering corruption among the public 
offi cials at the level of the local government, as 
well as at the public services most frequently 
contacted by the business representatives 
seem to be signifi cant determinants of their 
apprehension of corruption as an obstacle in 
the business environment, as expected in our 
model.
Baseline results of our study fi t in 
line with a number of previous empirical 
investigations that accentuate the ineffi ciencies 
on administrative and political levels as 
signifi cant predictors of corruption in business 
environment. Weak institutions and ineffi cient 
regulations have been identifi ed as factors that 
fuel corruption (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013). 
Based on the analysis of CEE and CIS countries, 
De Rosa et al. (2015) indicate that bribery is 
more harmful in countries where corruption is 
more prevalent and the institutions are weak. 
Similarly, an investigation of corruption in 
business environment in transition countries 
(Nowak, 2001) confi rms that ineffi ciency at 
administrative levels determines the extent 
to which corruption can fi nd fertile ground 
to spread. According to a recent study of 
corruption from a business sector perspective 
in western Balkans (Budak & Rajh, 2011), 
business representatives who perceive a rise in 
corruption in their environment tend to attribute 
this problem exclusively to the government. 
Corruption is found to have a deteriorating 
effect on business climate, altering the fi rms’ 
incentives to grow, invest or innovate, which 
leads to low-quality business environment 
(Blackburn & Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Gauthier 
& Goyette, 2014; O’Toole & Tarp, 2014). 
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In a survey of fi rms worldwide, Brunetti et al. 
(1997) accentuate that corruption is among the 
highest obstacles for doing business, especially 
in the case of underdeveloped countries. 
Focusing on nine CEE countries, Gamberoni 
et al. (2016) investigate how corruption in 
business environment affects the total factor 
productivity. They fi nd evidence that in small 
countries, with weak quality and effectiveness 
of its regulations, increase in corruption is 
associated with rising misallocation of capital 
and labour across fi rms. Consequently, our 
fi ndings do not provide empirical support for the 
argument that corruption can benefi t economic 
performance in the environment of ineffi cient 
institutional environments, often referred to 
as “the speed money hypothesis” (Leff, 1964; 
Bardhan, 1997).
Based on the model developed in this 
paper, useful predictions can be obtained 
regarding the effects that anti-corruption 
policy measures, related to strengthening 
the institutional framework, increasing 
transparency and suppressing bribes, can 
have on corruption perceptions of the existing 
and potential business actors. For example, 
we can predict with the signifi cance level of 
p = 0.000, that the probability of business 
actors perceiving corruption as a very severe 
obstacle in the environment of frequent bribes 
and unoffi cial payments and decisive impact of 
such payments to local and regional offi cials on 
fi rms (i.e. all predictors holding highest values) 
is 0.82. On the other hand, the probability 
that business actors will not see corruption as 
obstacle to their business in an environment 
with no bribes and informal gifts is as high as 
0.73. Predicted probabilities of each of the 
values of our dependent variable (no obstacle 
– very severe obstacle) with the highest 
and lowest values of predictor variables are 
presented in Tab. 10).
It is clear from the output above that the 
probability that business actors will perceive 
corruption being an obstacle to business 
signifi cantly decreases in the environment 
cleared from the practices of informal payments 
in business transactions.
Conclusions
Corruption is identifi ed as a serious obstacle 
to business transactions and an impediment to 
economic growth and investment. The existing 
literature indicates that corruption tends to be 
lower in the environment characterized by strong 
and effective institutions, contract enforceability 
and professional bureaucracy. In this study 
we examine the perceptions of corruption in 
the business community and attempt to offer 
possible explanations of the underlying causes 
of attitudes towards corruption.
Our research provides evidence on the 
relevance of institutional environment for 
doing business. The main fi ndings of this 
Predictions of Corruption 
as obstacle to business Margin
Delta 
method 
Std. Err.
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
All predictors 
held at lowest 
levels
No obstacle .7313645 .0528766 13.83 0.000 .6277282 .8350008
Minor obstacle .1406722 .0288015 4.88 0.000 .0842223 .1971221
Moderate obstacle .0840760 .0216458 3.88 0.000 .0416510 .1265010
Major obstacle .0294617 .0101565 2.90 0.004 .0095554 .0493680
Very severe obstacle .0144256 .0059902 2.41 0.016 .0026851 .0261661
All predictors 
held at 
highest levels
No obstacle .0085146 .0063711 1.34 0.181 -.003972 .0210017
Minor obstacle .0125290 .0088394 1.42 0.156 -.004795 .0298540
Moderate obstacle .0432569 .0276391 1.57 0.118 -.010914 .0974284
Major obstacle .1129983 .0637427 1.77 0.076 -.011935 .2379318
Very severe obstacle .8227012 .1015568 8.10 0.000 .6236535 1.021749
Source: author’s calculations based on BEEPS V (EBRD, 2015)
Tab. 10: Adjusted predictions of perceived corruption levels
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study indicate that the frequency of unoffi cial 
payments or gifts that business actors need 
to make in order to deal with public services 
(customs, tax offi ce) act as signifi cant 
predictors of corruption perceptions regarding 
business environment. Similarly, perceptions of 
corruption as harmful for business operations 
tend to increase in the ambience where fi rms 
are exposed to discretionary power of public 
offi cials at the local and regional level, subject 
to unoffi cial payments or gifts.
The fi ndings imply the relevance of 
considering perceptions of corruption in the 
business community in view of designing 
effective anti-corruption policies and strategies. 
The specifi ed model allows the possibility 
of predicting the probable effects that anti-
corruption policy measures, related to the 
improvement of business environment in terms 
of strengthening integrity and transparency 
of public services, can have on corruption 
perceptions of the existing and potential 
business actors. Important implication of the 
research is that targeted action of national 
governments against corruption can increase 
the effi ciency of doing business, particularly in 
countries with weak institutions and low trust 
in authorities. Although reducing the level of 
corruption and improving the image of a country 
is not an easy task, willingness and readiness 
of government to put in place legislations and 
regulations to control actual corruption is an 
important sign to business actors.
The authors are grateful to the Republic 
of Serbia Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technological Development for the funds and 
support that made this research possible.
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Abstract
PERCEIVED CORRUPTION IN BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT: EXPLORING THE 
UNDERLYING CAUSES
Marija Džunić, Nataša Golubović
This paper presents an empirical contribution to the literature that tends to explain variations in 
corruption perceptions. Drawing on theoretical assumptions about the impact of corruption on the 
quality of the business environment, we explore possible determinants of perceived corruption. 
We argue that explaining the determinants of corruption perceptions could be a valuable input for 
creating effective anti-corruption policies. In the paper, we perform a detailed analysis on the case 
of Serbia, a transition country with relatively widespread corruption in the business environment. 
Using the non-parametric analysis of variance test, we examine the signifi cance of differences 
in the perceived spread of corruption across a number of independent variables (regions, size of 
locality, industry, size, and years of operation). Specifying an ordered logistic regression model, we 
estimate the relation between corruption perceptions and a number of potential causes: frequencies 
of unoffi cial payments or gifts for different purposes, the impact that unoffi cial payments to public 
offi cials have on the business operations of the respondents, as well as attitudes of the respondents 
about the quality of the judicial system and political stability. We fi nd that perceptions of corruption 
as an obstacle to business operations can be linked to the frequency of unoffi cial payments to deal 
with customs and taxes, as well as the impact of unoffi cial payments to local or regional government 
offi cials on business performance of the respondents. The results provide useful insights into what 
policy measures are necessary to reduce the level of corruption, as well as how the effects of such 
measures can be assessed.
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